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Abstract
We report the development and validation of a measure that distinguished knowledge goals focused 
on acquiring knowledge and information from learning from failure goals focused on using failure 
as an opportunity to learn. In Study 1, the scale demonstrated a robust factor structure and adequate 
internal consistencies, and the two learning goals differently correlated with measures of ego-involved 
achievement goals. In Study 2, the goal to learn from failure interacted with academically contingent self-
worth, reducing self-esteem vulnerability when people invested effort and failed. In Study 3, the goal to 
learn from failure reduced the effect of academic contingencies of self-worth on self-esteem, especially 
among the incremental theorists who invested effort prior to failure.
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Introduction 
Learning promotes human growth and thriving (e.g., Ryan & Deci, 2000; Pyszczynski, 
Greenberg, & Solomon, 2000; White, 1959). The need for competence is “a fundamental 
motivation that serves the evolutionary role of helping people develop and adapt to their 
environment” (Elliot & Dweck, 2005; p.6). Moreover, personal learning can extend beyond 
the self to benefit others. Cardiac surgery teams, for example, make mistakes when they adopt 
new technologies but their ability to learn from their mistakes can ultimately save many lives 
(Edmondson, 2003).  
However, people often seem to resist learning, precisely at times when they most need 
to learn. We argue that people have difficulty learning from mistakes, setbacks, and failures 
because protecting and boosting self-esteem often take precedence over learning. Even people 
who hold learning goals may struggle to learn from failure if they also have the goal of 
demonstrating their ability and boosting their sense of self-worth. The present research focused 
on developing and validating a measure of learning goals in which failure signals a learning 
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opportunity instead of a threat to self-esteem. 
Costs of Pursuing Self-Esteem for Learning from Failure
Pursuing self-esteem undermines learning (Crocker & Park, 2004). People who seek to 
prove their self-worth by validating their abilities or demonstrating their competence view 
mistakes, failures, and criticism as threats rather than learning opportunities. Following 
mistakes, failure, or setbacks, people often engage in defensive or counterproductive activities 
that diminish their learning opportunities (Argyris, 1992). For example, under self-esteem 
threat, people reject or dismiss negative feedback (e.g., Baumeister, 1998; Mischel, Ebbesen, 
& Zeiss, 1976), derogate the source of negative feedback (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & 
Solomon, 1982), or search for explanations that diminish their own responsibility (Bradley, 
1978; Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 1985; Zuckerman, 1979). They also compensate with self-
enhancement in other domains (Gollwitzer & Wicklund, 1985) or with past successes (Trope & 
Neter, 1994), engage in downward comparisons (Crocker, Thompson, McGraw, & Ingerman, 
1987), or distance themselves from others who outperform them (Tesser, 1988). When people 
respond to setbacks or failures by focusing on protecting self-esteem or reducing negative 
affect, they miss an opportunity to identify and understand their own contribution to the 
problem. This, in turn, diminishes the likelihood that they will address their own contribution 
and avoid the same problem in the future. 
Self-handicapping (Jones & Berglas, 1978; Rhodewalt & Tragakis, 2002) ―the proactive 
defense of self-esteem in advance of failures ― also undermines learning. On difficult tasks 
that carry a risk of failure, people who worry about demonstrating their competence and 
protecting their self-esteem engage in behaviors that simultaneously decrease the probability 
of success and provide a plausible excuse for failure that does not indict competence. For 
example, drinking alcohol before important meetings (Jones & Berglas, 1978), listening to 
distracting music while studying (Rhodewalt & Davison, 1986), and acting obnoxiously on a 
first date all provide a compelling justification for potential failure without implicating one’s 
fundamental competence or likeability. People who engage in self-handicapping can thus 
maintain their image of a competent self even after failure but fail to learn about their real 
strengths and weaknesses. 
The most common self-handicapping strategy involves diminished effort, practice, or 
persistence toward a goal (Rhodewalt & Tragakis, 2002). Persistence, practice, and investment 
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of effort endanger self-esteem because failure after exerting high effort is perceived to imply 
a lack of ability (Covington, 1992). For people who involve their ego or who stake their self-
esteem in a domain, lack of ability also implies low self-worth (Crocker & Wolfe, 2001; James, 
1890). To avoid the esteem-threatening implications of failure, some people unconsciously 
reduce their investment of effort or practice, which in turn reduces their learning opportunities. 
Although failure is never pleasant, some failures threaten self-esteem more than others. 
Failure is particularly threatening when self-esteem is contingent on succeeding in a domain 
(Crocker & Wolfe, 2001) and when people fail despite investing high effort. Failure in a 
domain of contingent self-worth causes drops in self-esteem (Crocker & Wolfe, 2001; Crocker, 
Sommers, & Luhtanen, 2002). The more people engage their self-worth in a domain, the more 
vulnerable they become to failure in that domain. When people invest effort and still fail, 
they cannot attribute failure to lack of effort; failure then indicates lack of ability, threatening 
self-esteem. In support of this idea, when highly contingent students had the opportunity to 
invest effort, they experienced greater self-esteem vulnerability to failure than less contingent 
students (Niiya & Crocker, 2008). 
In sum, learning from failure is important but difficult, because honest exploration of 
one’s own contribution to mistakes or failure threatens self-esteem, especially when failure 
occurs in domains that are linked to self-worth, when high effort has been expended, and when 
excuses for failure have not been arranged in advance by self-handicapping. To diminish the 
threat, people proactively create excuses for failure or find self-serving explanations for failure, 
undermining learning. The goal of protecting self-esteem by demonstrating competence 
transforms failure and setbacks from learning opportunities to self-esteem threats. 
Failure as a Learning Opportunity
The difficulty of learning from failure has been addressed extensively in studies of 
organizational behavior. Argyris (1992) distinguished two types of learning, single-loop and 
double-loop. According to Argyris (1992), when people fail to obtain intended outcomes, they 
often engage in single-loop learning, which consists of “identifying and correcting errors in 
the external environment” (p.127). Argyris found that single-loop learning functions well for 
routine, repetitive tasks but not for more complex problems with multiple causes. Double-
loop learning involves looking inward, first reflecting on one’s own mistakes and how one 
might have contributed to the problem before changing actions. Under double-loop learning, 
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people use failures, errors, and problems as an opportunity to identify weaknesses within the 
system and within themselves to address them in the future. For example, in a health care 
system, single-loop learning occurs when practitioners find gaps between actual practices and 
guidelines and implement changes to follow the guidelines more closely (Nutley & Davies, 
2001). In contrast, double-loop learning occurs when practitioners respond to a clinical audit 
by first reflecting on what might have caused the practices to deviate from the guidelines and 
how they might have contributed to the problem before engaging in remedial action. Argyris 
(1992) observed that double-loop learning rarely occurs, even among managers who have been 
extensively trained to engage in double-loop learning.
We propose that many people want to acquire knowledge and information, but few people 
embrace failure as a learning opportunity. Because failure threatens self-esteem, especially 
following high effort, in the absence of defensive strategies such as self-handicapping, and 
when the failure occurs in domains of contingent self-worth, most people respond defensively 
to failure—the desire to protect self-esteem or their self-image outweighs their desire to 
learn. Yet, the desire to learn from failure is crucially important on difficult tasks where 
failure occurs with some regularity. In the present research, we aimed to develop and validate 
measures that would distinguish the goal of acquiring knowledge and information from the 
goal of learning from failure. We expect that people who want to learn from failure also want 
to acquire knowledge and information, but the reverse is not necessarily true—some people 
want to acquire knowledge and information, but do not embrace failure as an opportunity to do 
so. We do not believe that people who embrace failure as a learning opportunity want to fail; 
rather, when they do fail, they want to learn from the experience.
We propose that people who view failure as a learning opportunity are less likely to view 
failure as a threat to self-esteem. Consequently when they do fail, their self-esteem should 
be resilient in the face of failure, even if they have exerted high effort and their self-worth is 
contingent. People who view failure as a learning opportunity should also be less likely to self-
handicap by withholding effort on difficult tasks, even when their self-worth is contingent.  
However, people who express the desire to acquire knowledge and information, but 
do not embrace failure as a learning opportunity, may view failure as a threat to self-worth. 
Consequently, we expect that the goal of acquiring knowledge, in the absence of viewing 
failure as an opportunity to learn, will lead to vulnerable self-esteem following failure, 
especially if effort has been invested and self-worth is contingent on the domain. 
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Relation to Achievement Goals
Existing measures of achievement goals do not adequately capture the distinction 
between the desire to acquire knowledge and information, and the desire to learn from 
failure. Researchers have typically distinguished two types of goals that influence how people 
approach, engage, and respond to achievement situations—performance goals and mastery 
goals. Performance goals focus on demonstrating competence, whereas mastery goals focus 
on acquiring new knowledge or developing competence (Grant & Dweck, 2003). Researchers 
have given different names to these goals. Performance goals have also been called ego-
involved goals (Nicholls, 1984) or ability-focused goals (Maehr & Midgley, 1991), whereas 
mastery goals have also been called learning goals (Dweck & Leggett, 1988), task-involved 
goals (Middleton & Midgely, 1997; Nicholls, 1984) or task-focused goals (Maehr & Midgley, 
1991).   
Mastery goals.  Mastery goals reflect the desire to learn, and therefore, both people 
who express the desire to acquire knowledge and those who express the desire to learn from 
failure should have mastery goals. However, some people who endorse mastery as a goal may 
still perceive failure as a threat to self-esteem rather than an opportunity to learn. Existing 
measures of mastery goals assess the desire to acquire knowledge and skills, but do not address 
whether people view failure in particular as a learning opportunity. Learning and mastery goals 
measures include items such as “I want to learn as much as possible from my classes” (Elliot 
& Church, 1997) or “I strive to constantly learn and improve in my courses” (Grant & Dweck, 
2003). Consequently, we expect mastery goals to be more strongly related to the desire to 
acquire information and knowledge than to the desire to learn from failure. 
Performance goals.  We suggest that performance goals are incompatible with embracing 
failure as a learning opportunity, but can be compatible with the goal of acquiring knowledge. 
Performance goals have variously been operationalized as performance-approach goals, in 
which the goal is to outperform others (Elliot & Church, 1997), performance-avoidance goals, 
in which the goal is to avoid doing worse than others (Elliot & Church, 1997), outcome-
focused goals, in which the goal is to obtain a particular outcome, such as a grade (Grant & 
Dweck, 2003), or ability-validation goals, in which the goal is to demonstrate or prove one’s 
competence (Grant & Dweck, 2003). When people have performance goals, they seek to 
demonstrate competence (Ames, 1992; Covington, 1984; Dweck, 1986). Acquiring knowledge 
and skills can help people demonstrate competence or avoid demonstrating incompetence; 
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therefore, we expect the goal of acquiring knowledge to be positively related to performance 
goals. When a task is challenging and failure is possible, however, we suggest that 
performance goals lead people to view failure as a threat, and interfere with viewing failure 
as a learning opportunity. Consequently, we expect that the goal of learning from failure is 
negatively related to performance goals.
Incremental theories.  Incremental theories of intelligence refer to a belief that 
intelligence is malleable and improvable (Dweck, 2000). Incremental theories orient people 
toward the goal of learning and improving (Dweck & Leggett, 1988). Because people can 
seek improvement either by accumulating knowledge or by identifying their weaknesses and 
addressing them, we expect the goal to acquire knowledge and the goal to learn from failure to 
both be positively correlated with incremental theories of intelligence. 
Fear of failure.  Previous research shows that mastery goals do not correlate with fear 
of failure (Elliot & Church, 1997) or with state test anxiety (Elliot & McGregor, 1999). 
Because knowledge acquisition goals overlap with mastery goals, we expect them to be 
distinct from fear of failure. Learning from failure goals should be negatively related to fear of 
failure. However, fear of failure is not simply the inverse of the goal of learning from failure; 
embracing failure as a learning opportunity implies an interest in failure, not merely the 
absence of fear. We therefore hypothesized that fear of failure would correlate negatively, but 
modestly, with learning from failure goals.  
Contingent self-worth.  People who base their self-worth on academic competence 
should not endorse the goal to learn from failure because for them, failure represents a threat 
to their self-worth that must be avoided. Highly contingent people should therefore seek to 
protect their competent self-image rather than learn about their weaknesses. People with 
highly contingent self-worth might, however, endorse the goal to acquire knowledge because 
acquiring knowledge ensures success and hence protects their self-esteem.  
In sum, although the goal to acquire knowledge and the goal to learn from failure should 
both be positively related to mastery goals and incremental theories of ability, we predict that 
existing measures of mastery goals have more in common with the goal to acquire knowledge 
than the goal to learn from failure. We also predict that the goal to acquire knowledge will be 
positively related to performance goals, and academically contingent self-worth, whereas the 
goal to learn from failure will be negatively related to these ego-involved constructs.  
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Relation to Self Constructs
We hypothesized that the goal of acquiring knowledge and the goal of learning from 
failure differently predict whether people view failure as a self-esteem threat. Consequently, 
we also investigated the convergent and divergent validity of the two goals with several self-
related constructs, including self-esteem, public and private self-consciousness, and self-
compassion. 
Self-esteem.  High self-esteem people are more secure and confident, and more certain 
of their self-views, but also more defensive, and specifically more likely to blame others for 
failure than low self-esteem people (see Baumeister, 1998; Crocker, Blaine, & Luhtanen, 1993, 
for reviews). Some high self-esteem people have fragile or unstable self-esteem, whereas 
others have resilient and stable self-esteem (Kernis, 2003). Consequently, we expected the 
goals of acquiring knowledge and learning from failure to be distinct from having high or low 
self-esteem. 
Public and private self-consciousness.  People differ in their tendency to reflect on 
public versus private aspects of the self (Buss, 1980; Fenigstein, 1987; Fenigstein, Scheier, 
& Buss, 1975). Public self-consciousness refers to awareness of how one appears to others, 
whereas private self-consciousness refers to awareness of one’s internal states and self-
reflection. Because the goal to acquire knowledge sometimes reflects concern with protecting 
or enhancing one’s self-image by demonstrating competence, we expected knowledge goals 
to correlate modestly with public self-consciousness. Learning from failure goals, on the other 
hand, indicate a desire to learn by reflecting on failure, including one’s own responsibility for 
the failure. Consequently, we expected that learning from failure goals would be associated 
with reduced public self-consciousness and with increased private self-consciousness. 
Self-Compassion.  We expected learning from failure goals to correlate with self-
compassion to a greater extent than knowledge goals. Self-compassion involves: 
being open to and aware of one’s own suffering, offering kindness and understanding 
towards oneself, desiring the self’s well-being, taking a non judgmental attitude 
towards one’s inadequacies and failures, and framing one’s own experience in light 
of the common human experience (Neff, 2005; p.264).
Learning from failure goals entail interest in personal weaknesses that encourages 
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change, rather than harsh self-criticism or condemnation. Without self-compassion, learning 
about one’s weaknesses can cause pain and distress, which, in turn, can lead to helplessness, 
self-abuse, or other-blame. We hypothesized that learning from failure goals reduce the threat 
of failure and encourage learning because these goals correlate with self-compassion that 
transforms negative emotions into more positive feelings such as kindness, connectedness, and 
openness (Neff, 2005). 
Relation to Coping and Resiliency
We also tested the discriminant validity of the scale by examining correlations with broad-
minded coping styles and resiliency. Broad-minded coping involves taking a broad perspective 
on problems and generating multiple solutions to them (Fredrickson & Joiner, 2002). The 
goal of learning from failure was expected to positively correlate with broad-minded coping 
because learning from failure requires people to step back from the problem and understand 
its multiple causes, including their own contribution to it. However, we expected the two 
constructs to be distinct, as broad-minded coping does not necessarily require one to see failure 
as an opportunity.
We also expected a positive correlation between the goal of learning from failure and 
ego-resiliency, characterized as the ability to bounce back from negative experiences and 
adapt to new demands of an ever-changing world (Block & Kremen, 1996). Viewing failure 
as a learning opportunity should make people resilient to failures, and foster adaptation to new 
environments. We therefore expected a moderate correlation between the two constructs.
Finally, we conceptualized knowledge goals and learning from failure goals, not as fixed 
individual differences, but as contextually dependent constructs. Just as individuals’ mastery 
and performance goals can vary depending on classroom settings and teachers’ instructions 
(Ames, 1992; Ames & Archer, 1988; Church, Elliot, & Gable, 2001; Wolters, 2004), we 
hypothesized that individuals’ endorsement of knowledge goals and learning from failure goals 
can change over time, depending on situations. We therefore expected a moderate test-retest 
correlation over one academic term.
Goals of Research
The present research aimed to develop and validate a psychometrically sound measure 
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of knowledge goals and learning from failure goals, and examine whether learning from 
failure goals are less compatible with ego-involvement than knowledge goals. Study 1 
examined the factor structure, reliabilities, and correlates of the knowledge goals and learning 
from failure goals scale. Studies 2 and 3 examined whether the goal to learn from failure 
reduced the vulnerability of self-esteem associated with academic contingencies of self-worth 
among participants who invested effort before failure. Students who base their self-worth on 
academics and believe they can improve should be particularly vulnerable to failure when 
they invest effort and fail. If the goal to learn from failure can reduce people’s concerns about 
proving self-worth, they should buffer the threat of failure more effectively than knowledge 
goals, adding validity to our measure of knowledge goals and learning from failure goals. 
Study 1
Method
Participants
We combined the data from three samples to perform exploratory and confirmatory factor 
analyses. The first sample consisted of 204 first-year college students recruited at the beginning 
of the fall semester as part of a longitudinal survey on “goals and adjustment to college.” 
Among these, 194 also completed a post-test questionnaire approximately two weeks before 
the end of the term (11 weeks after the pretest). 1 The second sample consisted of 152 college 
students2  recruited through flyers for a study on “coping with exam stress.” The third sample 
consisted of 169 college students recruited from the psychology subject pool for a study on 
“the effect of practice on intellectual performance.” A total of 525 participants constituted 
the combined sample (177 men, 345 women, and 3 unknown). Participants mostly identified 
themselves as “White or European American” (63.0 %) or “Asian or Asian American” (21.3%), 
with a smaller percentage identifying as “Black or African American” (6.1%), “Hispanic/
Latino/Latina” (3.2%), and “Other / Mixed Race” (5.3%). Their age ranged from 17 to 33, 
with a mean of 18.8 (SD = 1.39). 
1 Post-test data from these participants were not included in the combined dataset because of non-
independence of data.
2 The initial sample consisted of 169 participants but data from 17 participants were not included in the 
analyses because their data were not correctly saved in the computer.
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Measures
Knowledge goals and learning from failure goals scale.  Ten items assessed how much 
one endorsed the goals of learning from failure and setback (e.g., “When I fail, I view it as a 
great opportunity to learn about my weaknesses and where I need to improve”) and four items 
assessed the extent to which one endorsed the goals of learning as a means of acquiring new 
information (e.g., “My main goal in my courses is to learn as much information as I can”). 
These items were selected from an initial pool of 21 items (eleven knowledge goals items 
adapted from Grant & Dweck, 2003, and 10 learning from failure goals items) from which we 
deleted 7 knowledge goals items that did not load on any factor in a pilot test with 55 college 
students.  
Other goals scales.  In addition, all participants completed the following scales: (1) 
the 5-item academic subscale of the Contingencies of Self-Worth Scale (Crocker, Luhtanen, 
Cooper, & Bouvrette, 2003; α = .84), which measured the extent to which one based self-
worth on academic competence (e.g., “I feel better about myself when I know I’m doing well 
academically”); (2) the 10-item Rosenberg’s Self-Esteem scale (Rosenberg, 1965; α = .88), a 
widely used and well-validated measure of global self-esteem; (3) the 7-item Ability Validation 
goal scale (α = .91) adapted from Grant and Dweck (2003), which measured the extent to 
which one endorsed the goal of validating intelligence (e.g., “One of my important goals is to 
validate that I am smart through my schoolwork”); and (4) the 8-item Theories of Intelligence 
scale (Dweck, 2000; α = .96) in which we reverse-scored the entity items so that higher score 
indicated endorsement of incremental theories. Participants in samples 1 and 2 also completed 
all three subscales of Elliot and Church’s (1997) Achievement Goal scale (i.e., performance-
approach, performance-avoidance, and mastery goals) whereas participants in sample 3 only 
completed the mastery goals subscale (αs = .92, .90, and .70, for mastery, approach, and 
avoidance goals respectively).
All the items from the Achievement Goal scale, Ability Validation goal scale, and 
Knowledge Goals and Learning from Failure Goals scale appeared in mixed order as a single 
scale to prevent participants from guessing the measured concepts. Response options ranged 
from 1 = Strongly Disagree to 7 = Strongly Agree, except in the Theories of Intelligence Scale 
that used a 6-point scale in samples 2 and 3. We transformed the latter scale into z-scores 
before computing the reliabilities and means. 
Participants in the first and second samples completed additional scales to further validate 
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the knowledge goals and learning from failure goals scale. Participants in the first sample also 
completed the Social Desirability scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964; α = .77) at Time 1, and 
the Self-Compassion scale (Neff, 2003; α = .83) and the Self-Consciousness scale (Scheier 
& Carver, 1985; αs = .85 for public and .74 for private self-consciousness) at Time 2. Both 
scales ranged from 1 to 5. Those in the second sample completed: (1) the Broad-Minded 
Coping subscale from Moos Coping Response Inventory (Moos, 1988; α = .70) in which 
participants described an academic failure and rated how often they engaged in each of the 5 
corresponding activities (e.g., “think of different ways to deal with the situation,” “try to find 
personal meaning in the situation”); (2) the Ego-Resiliency Scale (Block & Kremen, 1996; α 
= .82), which measured the ability to adapt to new environments (e.g., “I enjoy dealing with 
new and unusual situations”); and (3) the Fear of Failure scale (Elliot & Thrash, 2003; α = 
.84) consisting of 9 items such as, “I often avoid a task because I am afraid that I will make 
mistakes.” All the response scales ranged from 1 to 7, except for the social desirability scale in 
which participants indicated whether the socially desirable statements were true (1) or false (0).
Procedure
Participants in the first sample filled out the paper-and-pencil version of the questionnaires 
in the lab for Time 1 and an online version of the questionnaire for Time 2. Participants also 
filled out a weekly web-survey over the term that will not be reported in this paper. They 
received $100 at the completion of the study. Participants in the second sample completed the 
questionnaire online and later came to the lab to complete an academic test (reported in Study 
2). Participants received $12 for their participation. Finally, those in the third sample came to 
the lab to fill out the questionnaire displayed on a computer screen and completed additional 
tasks (reported in Study 3). These participants received partial credit for their introductory 
psychology class. All participants were debriefed at the completion of the study.  
Results and Discussion
Overview
The factor analyses were conducted in five phases. First, we divided the sample into 
two random halves and performed exploratory factor analyses (EFA) on the first half to 
refine the measure (Phase 1). Next, using EQS software, we conducted confirmatory factor 
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analyses (CFA) in the second random half (Phase 2) to cross-validate the factors obtained in 
Phase 1. In Phase 3, we used the combined sample to compare the two-factor model with a 
one-factor model in which we forced all items to load on a single learning factor. In Phase 
4, we compared the factor structures across gender and race subgroups. Finally, in Phase 5, 
we tested the invariance of the model across time. After we established the factor structure 
of the Knowledge Goals and Learning from Failure Goals scale, we computed the means of 
knowledge goals and learning from failure goals and examined their correlations with other 
related measures.  
Refinement of the Initial Model
We first performed an EFA on the first random half of the data (n = 268), using principal 
axis extraction and promax rotation, which allowed correlations among the factors, as 
recommended by Russell (2003). We expected correlated factors because knowledge goals and 
learning from failure goals both reflect learning goals. The initial scree plot indicated a 2-factor 
solution, explaining 39% of the variance. When a 2-factor solution was specified, four items of 
the knowledge goals scale loaded highly (loadings above .40) on the first factor and six items 
in the learning from failure goals scale loaded highly on the second factor, with cross-loadings 
of less than .20. The other four items of the learning from failure goals scale were found to 
be problematic: one item loaded on the first factor with the other knowledge goals items, and 
three items had either a primary loading of less than .40 or had a cross-loading greater than 
.20. Therefore, we dropped these four items and conducted the EFA again with four knowledge 
goals items and six learning from failure goals items that had clean initial loadings on the first 
and second factors. This time, the two factors explained 46% of variance. The four knowledge 
goals items loaded highly (> .50) on the first factor and all six learning from failure goals items 
loaded highly (> .40) on the second factor, but one learning from failure goals item also cross-
loaded (.23) on the first factor. Thus, we dropped the cross-loaded item and conducted the EFA 
again. In this analysis, all knowledge goals items loaded highly (> .50) on the first factor and 
all except one learning from failure goals item loaded highly on the second factor, with cross-
loadings of less than .20. This learning from failure goals item had only a primary loading of 
.34 on the second (learning from failure goals) factor, but we kept the item because it only 
loaded .10 on the first (knowledge goals) factor, indicating that the item could be effective in 
distinguishing knowledge goals and learning from failure goals. In the final model, the two 
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factors correlated at r = .48 and together explained 47.2% of variance. 
Cross-Validation of the Correlated Two-Factor Model
Next, we conducted CFA to test whether the correlated two-factor model obtained in 
Phase 1 fit the data in the second random half (n = 257). First, we tested the fit of the model 
separately for each random half. Then, we tested two between-group models to examine 
the equivalence of the fit across the two samples. Specifically, we compared: (1) the factor 
pattern invariant model in which we specified a common factor pattern but did not constrain 
the factor loadings to be equivalent across samples; and (2) the factor loading invariant 
model in which we constrained both factor pattern and factor loadings to be equivalent across 
samples. Because the two models were nested, we examined the difference in χ2 between the 
two models to test whether the constraints on the equivalence of factor loadings statistically 
reduced the model fit.
Summaries of the goodness-of-fit indices are presented in Table 1. In both halves, 
the correlated two-factor model had a good fit as indicated by the non-significant χ2, the 
comparative fit index (CFI) and nonnormed fit index (NNFI) above .95, and the standardized 
root mean-square residual (SRMR) and the root mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA) 
below .05. All items loaded significantly on the intended factor, with standard loadings ranging 
from .41 to .89 in the first half and from .43 to .87 in the second half. In both samples, the 
modification indices showed that allowing one item in the learning from failure goals to 
cross-load on the knowledge goals factor would statistically improve the fit of the model. We 
therefore re-ran CFA in both samples, allowing the item to load on both factors. As predicted 
in the modification indices, the model fit slightly improved in both samples (Δ χ2(1) = 4.37, 
p < .05 in sample 1 and Δ χ2(1) = 4.43, p < .05 in sample 2). However, the item still loaded 
primarily on the learning from failure goals factor (standard loadings of .42 and .48) with 
cross-loadings of only .17 and .16 on the knowledge goals factor. Because the cross-loadings 
were small (less than .20) in both samples, we concluded that the results supported our model.   
As shown in lines 3 and 4 of Table 1, both the factor pattern invariant model and the 
factor loading invariant model had a good fit. The difference in χ2 between the two models 
was not significant (Δ χ2(7) = 5.75, n.s.), indicating that the factor loadings did not statistically 
differ across the two samples. Consistent with this conclusion, the modification indices in 
the factor loading invariant model did not suggest any modification that would statistically 
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increase the model fit. In sum, the correlated two-factor models provided a good fit in both 
random halves with all factor loadings above .40 and with cross-loadings of less than .17, 
supporting the validity and generalizability of the two-factor model.   
Comparison between the Two-Factor Model and the One-Factor 
Model
We hypothesized a positive correlation between knowledge goals and learning from 
failure goals because both goals focused on learning. A plausible alternative model would have 
all the items loaded on a single factor, capturing the overall learning orientation. In Phase 3, 
we compared the correlated two-factor model with the one-factor model to test which model 
better accounted for our data. The results of the CFA using the combined dataset (N = 525) 
are shown in Table 1. The goodness-of-fit indices showed that the correlated two-factor model 
had a good fit whereas the one-factor model had a poor fit. Comparison of χ2 showed that the 
correlated two-factor model fit the data significantly better than the one-factor model, Δ χ2(2) = 
176.28, p < .001.3 The standardized and unstandardized factor loadings of the correlated two-
factor model appear in Table 2.       
Invariance across Gender and Ethnicity
We expected the correlated two-factor model to equally apply to both genders. In Phase 4, 
we conducted CFAs separately for each gender and then compared two between-group models, 
the factor pattern invariant model, and the factor loadings invariant model to directly test 
the equivalence of factor structure across the two groups.As shown in Table 1, the correlated 
two-factor model had a good fit for women (n = 345) and an acceptable fit for men (n = 177), 
despite the small sample size for men (Kline, 1998 suggests at least 10 observations per 
parameter). The standardized loadings ranged from .39 to .96 for men and from .41 to .80 for 
women. 
The factor loading invariant model, in which we constrained the factor loadings to be 
equivalent across gender, had only an acceptable fit, with a significant χ2. The difference in 
χ2 between the two nested models was significant, Δ χ2(7) = 19.18, p < .01, indicating that 
3 The two models are not nested, so they cannot be directly compared; the difference in chi-square should 
be interpreted with caution.
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the factor loading invariant model had a worse fit than the factor pattern invariant model. 
Examination of the modification indices suggested that the constraint on variance equivalence 
for the first factor (knowledge goals factor) primarily accounted for the decrement in the model 
fit. Freeing the constraint of variance equivalence for the first factor resulted in a good fit of the 
factor loading invariant model, a fit that did not differ from the factor pattern invariant model, 
Δ χ2(6) = 3.77, n.s. In this latter model, the standardized factor loadings ranged from .40 to .93 
for men and from .32 to .77 for women. As our previous analysis suggested, the knowledge 
goals factor had a greater estimated variance for men (.31) than for women (.14). Overall, the 
correlated two-factor model fit the data equally well for both genders.  
 Our sample consisted of a majority of Whites (n = 331), with a smaller number of 
Asian / Asian Americans (n = 112). We did not include Black (n = 32), Hispanic (n = 17), and 
“other or mixed race” (n = 28) categories in analyses comparing the fit across racial groups 
due to small sample sizes. Because the sample size for Asian / Asian Americans was still too 
small for CFA, we conducted EFA for both White and Asian categories. We specified a two-
factor solution with principal axis factoring and promax rotation. For Whites, all items loaded 
on the intended factor (loadings ranging from .38 to .95), with cross-loadings of less than .20. 
The two factors correlated at .46 and accounted for 46.6% of total variance. For Asians and 
Asian Americans, all items except one loaded highly on the intended factor (loadings ranging 
from .46 to .83), with cross-loadings of less than .20. One item from the learning from failure 
goals scale (“Becoming a better learner is more important than performing well in a class.”) 
had a loading of .30 on the learning from failure goals factor and .28 on the knowledge goals 
factor, suggesting that the item does not distinguish learning from failure goals and knowledge 
goals for Asians and Asian Americans. The two factors explained 50.4% of total variance 
and correlated at .42. In sum, we replicated the two-factor structure in both the White and the 
Asian / Asian American samples, except for one learning from failure goals item that did not 
load highly on either factor in the Asian sample.  
Invariance across Time
Finally, in Phase 5, we examined the stability of the factor structure over time using Time 
1 and Time 2 data from the longitudinal study (sample 1). First, we conducted CFAs separately 
Acquiring Knowledge and Learning from Failure:Theory, Measurement, and Validation of Two Learning Goals
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for Time 1 data (n = 204) and Time 2 data (n = 194). Then, we tested two longitudinal models 
with correlated error terms across time and paths from factors at Time 1 to the same factors 
at Time 2.4  Again, we compared: (1) the factor pattern invariant model in which we only 
specified the factor pattern at Time 1 to be identical to the factor pattern at Time 2; and (2) the 
factor loading invariant model in which we constrained the factor loadings to be equivalent 
across time. As shown in Table 1, Time 1 data fit the correlated two-factor model well but 
Time 2 data had only an acceptable fit. The modification indices suggested that allowing one 
item from the learning from failure goals scale and one item from the knowledge goals scale 
to cross-load on the other factor would significantly improve the fit of Time 2 data. Consistent 
with the suggestions, the model showed a good fit when we allowed these items to load on 
both factors (χ2 (26) = 29.74, n.s.; CFI = .98; NNFI = .97; SRMR = .05; RMSEA = .04; 90% 
CI = .00, .07). The learning from failure goals item that could load on both factors had a 
standardized loading of .83 on the learning from failure goals factor and -.23 on the knowledge 
goals factor, indicating that the item still loaded clearly on the intended factor. The knowledge 
goals item that could load on both factors had a loading of .24 on the knowledge goals factor 
and a loading of .32 on the learning from failure goals factor, suggesting that the item did not 
load highly on either factor. 
The comparison between the factor pattern invariant model and the factor loading 
invariant model indicated the stability of factor loadings across time. Constraining the 
equivalence of factor loadings across time did not statistically decrease the goodness of fit (Δ 
χ2(7) = 4.97, n.s.). In the factor loading invariant model, the standardized loadings ranged from 
.34 to .82 at Time 1 and from .37 to .79 at Time 2. Although one knowledge goals item did 
not load on either factor at Time 2, the overall findings suggest stability of the factor structure 
across time. 
In sum, the correlated two-factor structure of the Knowledge Goals and Learning from 
Failure Goals scale fit the data better than the one-factor model and generalized across gender 
and time. The factor structure remained consistent for both White and Asian / Asian American 
samples except for one item that did not load on either factor for the Asian / Asian American 
sample. The resulting scale consisted of five learning from failure goals items (α = .65) and 
four knowledge goals items (α = .69). 
4 At Time 2, we correlated the disturbances (residuals) of the knowledge goals and learning from failure 
goals factors, to estimate the correlations between the two factors.
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Test-Retest Correlation
Knowledge goals and learning from failure goals showed some stability, as well as change 
over time. In the longitudinal study (sample 1), the test-retest correlations for the knowledge 
goals and learning from failure goals were moderate (.48 and .54 respectively, ps < .001) and 
somewhat lower than those of mastery goals (r = .65), performance-approach goals (r = .72), 
performance-avoidance goals (r = .70), and ability-validation goals (r = .57). These moderate 
correlations suggest that these goals do not reflect stable traits but rather more malleable goals 
that may have shifted over the course of a few months for many students. 
Convergent and Discriminant Validity of Knowledge Goals and 
Learning from Failure Goals
Correlations with mastery and performance goals. Table 3 summarizes the means, 
standard deviations, and intercorrelations of the variables measured in the study.
As expected, knowledge goals and learning from failure goals both correlated positively 
with mastery goals and incremental theory of intelligence, indicating that both goals reflect 
a learning orientation. Although learning from failure goals and knowledge goals positively 
correlated with each other, they showed distinct patterns of correlations with the other 
measures. Knowledge goals correlated positively with performance-approach, performance-
avoidance, and academic ability-validation goals, as well as academic contingencies of self-
worth (rs ranging from .13 to .20, ps < .05). Learning from failure goals, however, correlated 
negatively with all of these measures (rs ranging from -.12 to -.13, p < .05), suggesting that 
learning from failure goals reflect a less ego-involved learning orientation than knowledge 
goals. 
The difference in correlations between the knowledge goals and learning from failure 
goals increased in magnitude when we computed partial correlations, partialling out learning 
from failure goals from knowledge goals and vice versa, yielding relatively “pure” indicators 
of the two types of learning goals. With learning from failure goals partialled out, knowledge 
goals positively correlated with performance-approach, performance-avoidance, and academic 
validation goals (rs ranging from .18 to .24, ps < .001), as well as with academic contingencies 
of self-worth (r = .25, p < .001). This again suggests that knowledge goals can be fueled by 
the desire to protect and enhance self-worth. In contrast, with knowledge goals partialled out, 
learning from failure goals negatively correlated with performance-approach, performance-
Acquiring Knowledge and Learning from Failure:Theory, Measurement, and Validation of Two Learning Goals
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avoidance, and academic validation goals (rs ranging from -.18 to -.21, ps < .001), as well as 
with academic contingencies of self-worth (r = -.20, p < .001). These findings suggest that 
learning from failure goals are less compatible with the goal of protecting and enhancing self-
worth than knowledge goals. 5 
In contrast to knowledge goals and learning from failure goals, mastery goals and 
incremental theories of intelligence did not show a negative correlation with the measures 
of ego-involvement. This lack of a negative correlation indicates that mastery goals and 
incremental theories are potentially compatible with ego-involvement, consistent with past 
findings that mastery and performance goals either positively correlated or did not correlate 
with each other (e.g., Harackiewicz, Barron, & Elliot, 1998). In sum, mastery goals and 
incremental theories do not seem to distinguish those who do and those who do not involve 
their egos in learning.    
One of our samples (i.e., the longitudinal study at Time 1) included a measure of socially 
desirable responding. Because both knowledge goals and learning from failure goals correlated 
with social desirability and gender (see Table 3), we conducted partial correlations in this 
subsample, controlling for social desirability and gender. Knowledge goals still positively 
correlated with all the measures, including mastery goals (r = .58, p < .001), performance-
approach and performance-avoidance goals (rs = .17, p < .05), ability-validation goals (r 
= .22, p < .01), and academic contingencies of self-worth (r = .30, p < .001). When we 
controlled for social desirability and gender, learning from failure goals correlated positively 
with mastery goals (r = .36, p < .001) but did not correlate with any other measures. Although 
not significant, learning from failure goals had negative correlation with the ego-involved 
measures, suggesting that these correlations statistically differ from the correlations between 
knowledge goals and ego-involved measures. When we controlled for knowledge goals in 
addition to gender and social desirability, all the negative correlations increased in magnitude 
5 Learning from failure goals did not simply reflect a combination between high mastery and low 
performance-approach goals. When we regressed learning from failure goals on mastery goals, 
performance-approach goals, and the interaction term, using the data of 319 participants in samples 1 and 
2 who completed both measures, mastery goals and performance goals independently predicted learning 
from failure goals (βs = .47 and -.13, p < .01, respectively) but did not interact with each other (β = -.03, 
n.s.). The absence of interaction between mastery goals and performance goals suggests that examining 
the interaction between mastery goals and performance goals does not serve as a proxy for learning from 
failure goals. Moreover, mastery and performance-approach goals only explained 24% of the variance 
in learning from failure goals, suggesting that learning from failure goals represent more than a mere 
combination of mastery and performance goals.
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and the correlation between learning from failure goals and ability-validation goals became 
statistically significant (r = -.14, p = .04). In sum, social desirability and gender accounted 
for the correlations between learning from failure goals, performance goals, and academic 
contingencies of self-worth but these correlations were significantly smaller than those with 
knowledge goals. Moreover, when controlling for knowledge goals, learning from failure goals 
predicted less ability-validation goals. These findings indicate that social desirability or gender 
do not fully account for the difference in correlations between knowledge goals and learning 
from failure goals.  
Correlations with self-related constructs. As shown in Table 3, learning from failure 
goals correlated positively with self-compassion. Our finding mirrored that of Neff, Hsieh, and 
Dejitterat (2005) who found that self-compassion correlated positively with mastery goals. 6 
In our study, however, self-compassion correlated with learning from failure goals to a greater 
extent than knowledge goals, suggesting that self-compassion does not relate to learning 
orientation in general but rather reflects a particular feature of learning from failure goals. 
Although the learning from failure goals scale captured the tendency to focus on criticism and 
failure, our findings suggest that people who have these goals do are not self-deprecating, but, 
rather, have compassion for their weaknesses. Compassion for one’s own weaknesses might 
reduce the threat associated with setbacks which may, in turn, encourage people to view failure 
as a learning opportunity. 
Consistent with our hypothesis that knowledge goals are more compatible with the goals 
of demonstrating competence than learning from failure goals, public self-consciousness (i.e. 
the tendency to focus attention on one’s public image) correlated positively with knowledge 
goals and negatively with learning from failure goals (see Table 3). The magnitude of these 
correlations increased when we partialled out knowledge goals from learning from failure 
goals and vice versa. On the other hand, private self-consciousness (i.e. the tendency to 
focus attention on one’s inner self) correlated more strongly with learning from failure goals 
than knowledge goals, suggesting that learning from failure goals encourage introspection 
more than knowledge goals. Those who endorse knowledge goals tend to devote attention to 
appearing competent, whereas those who endorse learning from failure goals tend to devote 
attention to understanding themselves rather than promoting an image of a competent self. 
These results support our idea that learning from failure goals should reduce one’s concern 
6 These researchers measured mastery goals using Midgley et al.’s (1997) Pattern of Adaptive Learning 
Survey or PALS.
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about appearing competent and increase acceptance of one’s flaws and weaknesses. 
Finally, both learning from failure goals and knowledge goals correlated positively with 
broad-minded coping and ego-resilience, and negatively with fear of failure, as shown at 
the bottom on Table 3. The magnitude of correlations resembled those of mastery goals and 
incremental theories. The moderate correlations (i.e., less than .40 in absolute value) indicate 
that learning from failure goals and knowledge goals relate to but differ from broad-minded 
coping, ego-resiliency, and fear of failure. 
Summary
Study 1 tested the factor structure, reliability, and correlates of the knowledge goals and 
learning from failure goals scale. Knowledge goals and learning from failure goals scales had 
a robust factor structure that remained consistent across gender and time. We replicated the 
factor structure for White and Asian samples, except for one learning from failure goals item 
that did not load on any factor in the Asian sample. The resulting scale had adequate internal 
consistencies and successfully distinguished learning goals that varied in their compatibility 
with the goals of protecting and proving self-worth. The moderate test-retest correlation 
over the 11-week interval suggested that the scale remains stable but not entirely captures an 
individual difference measure. 
Study 2
Study 2 examined whether the goal to acquire knowledge and the goal to learn from 
failure differently predict state self-esteem following failure. In light of evidence from Study 
1 that learning from failure goals are less compatible with ego-involvement than knowledge 
goals, we predicted that learning from failure goals, but not knowledge goals, would reduce 
the effect of academic contingencies on post-failure self-esteem. People whose self-esteem 
is contingent on academic competence respond to academic failure with greater drops in 
self-esteem than those with less contingent self-esteem (Crocker & Wolfe, 2001; Crocker, 
Sommers, Luhtanen, 2002). The goal to learn from failure, however, should reduce the effect 
of academic contingencies because it encourages people with highly contingent self-esteem 
to see failure as a learning opportunity, not as a disconfirmation of their self-worth. We did 
not expect knowledge goals, or any other learning goals, to reduce the effect of academic 
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contingencies because learning-oriented people with highly contingent self-esteem may seek 
to learn to prove self-worth, making them vulnerable to failure.   
In Study 2, we examined how knowledge goals and learning from failure goals predict 
state self-esteem under conditions particularly threatening to the ego—when people fail a 
difficult task after investing effort in practice or preparation (Covington, 1992). We chose 
to examine a situation in which people fail despite investing high effort on practice because 
we expected the difference between knowledge goals and learning from failure goals to be 
particularly salient under high ego-threat. When failure occurs despite investing high effort, 
people who seek to learn to prove competence should experience threat to their self-esteem. 
Lack of improvement despite effort would suggest that they lack the requisite ability to 
validate their competence. In contrast, for those who seek to learn without involving their ego, 
failure should not threaten self-esteem even when they have invested high effort because they 
see failure as a learning opportunity. In the absence of effort, however, both knowledge goals 
and learning from failure goals could be effective in protecting self-esteem.  
Method
Participants
The 152 college students in Sample 2 of Study 1 (51 men, 100 women, and 1 participant 
of unknown gender) participated in Study 2. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 33 years 
(mean age 19.7), and were recruited through flyers posted in public locations on campus 
offering $12 for participating in a study on “Coping with Exam Stress.” Participants mostly 
identified themselves as “White or European American” (43.4 %) or “Asian or Asian 
American” (34.2%), with a minority of “Black or African American” (11.2%), “Hispanic” 
(3.3%), and “Other / Mixed Race” (6.6%). 
Procedure
Participants who expressed interest in the study first completed a web survey consisting 
of several pretest measures. Upon completion of the web survey, participants came to the lab 
in groups of up to 12 and worked individually on a shortened version of the GRE analytical 
ability test (Stewart, 1999) programmed with Visual Basic. Before the actual GRE, all 
participants received four easy GRE practice questions with answers and explanations which 
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they could study for up to 8 minutes. To ensure that all participants spent time on the practice 
problems, the practice session was programmed so that participants could not see the answers 
and explanations until they provided the right answer. The majority of participants (71.1%) 
used all 8 minutes on the practice questions, suggesting that they invested some effort on the 
task. 
When participants completed all 4 practice questions, or after 8 minutes had passed, they 
had 15 minutes to complete the “real” GRE analytical test, consisting of 2 problem sets (6 
questions in the first problem set and 4 in the second). Both problem sets were characterized 
as “challenging” questions in a GRE preparatory book (Stewart, 1999). When participants 
finished all 10 questions or when they had used all the allotted time, the computer displayed 
their actual score on the GRE test. Immediately following the feedback, participants completed 
measures of state self-esteem and manipulation check questions about the difficulty and 
diagnosticity of the test. Finally, participants were probed for suspicion, provided some 
demographic information, and were fully debriefed.
Pre-test Measures
As noted in Study 1, the web survey consisted of a battery of questionnaires designed 
to examine the construct validity of the knowledge goals and learning from failure goals 
scale. The pretest included: (1) the academic Contingencies of Self-Worth subscale (Crocker, 
Luhtanen, Cooper, & Bouvrette, 2003; α = .86); (2) the Knowledge Goals and Learning from 
Failure Goals scale (αs = .76 and .70 for knowledge goals and learning from failure goals); (3) 
Elliot and Church’s (1997) mastery goals subscale (α = .81); (4) the Theories of Intelligence 
scale (Dweck, 2000; the entity items were reverse-scored so that higher scores indicated 
incremental theories; α = .92), and (5) Rosenberg’s Self-Esteem scale (Rosenberg, 1965; α = 
.90). 
Post-test Measures
After participants completed the GRE test and received feedback indicating (correctly) 
that they had performed poorly, they filled out the “right now” version of the Rosenberg self-
esteem scale (α = .93). Participants also completed a manipulation check item about the 
difficulty of the test (“How difficult was the GRE analytical test?”) and a question about the 
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diagnosticity of the test (“How accurate do you think the GRE analytical test is as a measure 
of your intelligence?”) on 7-point scales.
Results
Before examining how academic contingencies of self-worth and learning from failure 
goals predicted reactions to academic failure, we first checked whether participants believed 
they failed the GRE test. We intentionally made the GRE test difficult so all participants would 
experience academic failure. Indeed, participants had on average only 1.99 correct answers 
out of 10, a score that did not differ from chance had participants chosen random answers 
among the 5 answer options (t (151) = .30, p = .77). As intended, all participants rated the test 
as difficult (M = 6.15, SD = .89). The mean statistically differed from the scale midpoint 4 
(t (150) = 29.89, p < .001), confirming that we successfully induced academic failure. Next, 
we factored out knowledge goals from learning from failure goals by regressing learning 
from failure goals on knowledge goals and saving the standardized residuals as an index of 
“pure” learning from failure goals. The residuals allowed us to examine how “pure” learning 
from failure goals moderated the effect of academic contingencies of self-worth on post-test 
self-esteem.7  We grand mean centered academic contingencies of self-worth following the 
recommendations of Aiken and West (1991). We then entered post-test state self-esteem as the 
dependent variable and academic contingencies of self-worth, learning from failure goals, and 
their interaction as predictors into the regression analysis. All subsequent analyses controlled 
for pre-test self-esteem, perceived diagnosticity, and perceived difficulty of the test. 
As expected, academic contingencies of self-worth predicted lower post-test self-esteem 
(β = -.27, p = .001) but the effect was qualified by the Academic CSW X Learning from failure 
goals interaction (β = .18, p = .02). For participants low on learning from failure goals, higher 
academic contingencies predicted lower post-test self-esteem, whereas for participants high on 
learning from failure goals, academic contingencies of self-worth did not predict post-test self-
esteem (see Figure 1). Consistent with our hypothesis that learning from failure goals attenuate 
the effect of academic contingencies on post-failure self-esteem, the analysis of simple slopes 
7 Entering learning from failure goals and knowledge goals simultaneously in the regression reveals the 
unique contribution of learning from failure goals on post-test self-esteem but does not provide a good test 
for the interaction between “pure” learning from failure goals and academic contingencies of self-worth. 
To examine this interaction, we would have to enter Knowledge goals X CSW interaction in the regression, 
which would result in high multicollinearity, particularly with Learning from failure X CSW interaction.
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indicated that academic contingencies significantly predicted lower self-esteem for those low 
on learning from failure goals (β = -.44, p = .001) but did not predict self-esteem for those high 
on learning from failure goals (β = -.11, p = .15). 
 We repeated the analysis with “pure” knowledge goals, mastery goals, and incremental 
theories as predictors of self-esteem in separate regressions. In all three analyses, academic 
contingencies of self-worth had a main effect on post-test self-esteem (βs < -.19, ps < .01) 
but none of the learning orientations interacted with academic contingencies (β = -.07, p = 
.41 for CSW X Knowledge goals; see Figure 2; β = .07, p = .40 for CSW X Mastery goals; 
and β = .08, p = .32 for CSW X Incremental Theories). The lack of interaction with academic 
contingencies of self-worth suggests that unlike learning from failure goals, knowledge goals, 
mastery goals, and incremental theories do not reduce the effect of academic contingencies on 
post-failure self-esteem. 
Discussion
Study 2 provided additional evidence for the validity of the distinction between 
knowledge goals and learning from failure goals. As predicted, the goal to learn from failure 
buffered self-esteem of highly contingent participants faced with failure. Following ego-
threatening failure, academic contingencies of self-worth did not predict lower self-esteem 
among those who endorsed the goal to learn from failure. Furthermore, neither knowledge 
goals, mastery goals, nor incremental theories of intelligence showed this buffering effect. 
Findings of Study 2 support our idea that not all learning goals are equally effective in 
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
Low Academic CSW High Academic CSW
Low Failure-Learning Goals High Failure-Learning Goals
Es
tim
at
ed
 P
os
tte
st
 S
ta
te
 S
el
f-E
st
ee
m 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Estimated Post-test State Self-Esteem by Academic Contingencies of 
Self-Worth (CSW) for Participants Low and High on Learning from Failure Goals 
(Study 2). 
 
 As expected, academic contingencies of self-worth predicted lower post-test 
self-esteem (β = -.27, p = .001) but the effect was qualified by the Academic CSW X 
Learning from failure goals interaction (β = .18, p = .02). For participants low on 
learning from failure goals, higher academic contingencies predicted lower post-test 
self-esteem, whereas for participants high on learning from failure goals, academic 
contingencies of self-worth did not predict post-test self-esteem (see Figure 1). 
Consistent with our hypothesis that learning from failure goals attenuate the effect of 
academic contingencies on post-failure self-esteem, the analysis of simple slopes 
indicated that academic contingencies significantly predicted lower self-esteem for 
those low on learning from failure goals (β= -.44, p = .001) but did not predict self-
esteem for those high on learning from failure goals (β= -.11, p = .15).  
  We repeated the analysis with “pure” knowledge goals, mastery goals, and 
incremental theories as predictors of self-esteem in separate regressions. In all three 
analyses, academic contingencies of self-worth had a main effect on post-test self-
esteem (βs < -.19, ps < .01) but none of the learning orientations interacted with 
academic contingencies (β = -.07, p = .41 for CSW X Knowledge goals; see Figure 2; β 
= .07, p = .40 for CSW X Mastery goals; and β = .08, p = .32 for CSW X Incremental 
Theories). The lack of interaction with academic contingencies of self-worth suggests 
that unlike learning from failure goals, knowledge goals, mastery goals, and incremental 
theories do not reduce the effect of academic contingencies on post-failure self-esteem.  
Discussion 
 Study 2 provided additional evidence for the validity of the distinction between 
knowledge goals and learning from failure goals. As predicted, the goal to learn from 
failure buffered self-esteem of highly contingent participants faced with failure. 
Following ego-threatening failure, academic contingencies of self-worth did not predict  
Figure 1: Estimated Post-test State Self-Esteem by Academic Contingencies of Self-
Worth (CSW) for Participants Low and High on Learning from Failure Goals (Study 2).
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reducing self-esteem vulnerability of people who have contingent self-worth even though these 
measures all reflect one’s orientation toward learning. Only learning from failure goals, which 
negatively correlated with ego-involved goals in Study 1, moderated the effect of academic 
contingencies. 
That the goal to learn from failure moderated the effect of academic contingencies when 
people invested effort in practice suggests that learning from failure goals may particularly 
help in high ego-threat situations. When highly contingent students expend effort on practice 
prior to failure, they may lose the possibility of attributing failure to lack of effort and practice, 
making their self-esteem more vulnerable. Unlike past studies, under high effort, knowledge 
goals, mastery goals, and incremental theories did not reduce self-esteem vulnerability. In 
contrast, learning from failure goals reduced the effect of academic contingencies precisely 
when people were most vulnerable to failure. 
One limitation of Study 2 was that it did not manipulate the investment of effort. 
Although the goal to learn from failure buffered self-esteem in an ego-threatening situation, 
it is not clear from this study whether learning from failure goals more effectively buffer 
self-esteem in high effort than in low effort situations. We addressed this question in Study 
3 by manipulating participants’ opportunity to practice before an academic test. Study 3 also 
manipulated participants’ beliefs about intelligence to examine whether the goal to learn 
from failure reduced the effect of contingencies of self-worth especially among those most 
vulnerable to failure: the incremental theorists who invested high effort but failed to improve. 
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Figure 2.  Estimated Post-test State Self-Esteem by Academic Contingencies of 
Self-Worth (CSW) for Participants Low and High on Knowledge Goals (Study 2). 
 
lower self-esteem among those who endorsed the goal to learn from failure. 
Furthermore, neither knowledge goals, mastery goals, nor incremental theories of 
int lligence showed t is buffering ffect. Findings of Study 2 support our idea that not 
all learning goals are equally effective in reducing self-esteem vulnerability of people 
who have contingent self-worth even though these measures all reflect one’s orientation 
toward learning. Only learning from failure goals, which neg tively correlated with ego-
involved goals in Study 1, moderated the effect of academic contingencies.  
 That th  goal to learn from failure moderated the eff ct of academic 
contingencies when people invested effort in practice suggests that learning from failure 
goals may particularly help in high ego-threat situations. When highly contingent 
students expend ffort on practice prior to failure, they may lose the possibility of 
attributing failure to lack of effort and practice, making their self-esteem more 
vulnerable. Unlike past studies, under high effort, knowledge goals, mastery goals, and 
incremental theories did not reduce self-esteem vulnerability. In contrast, learning from 
failure goals reduced the effect of academic contingencies precisely when people were 
most vulnerable to failure.  
 One limitation of Study 2 was that it did not manipulate the investment of effort. 
Although the goal to learn from failure buffered self-esteem in an ego-threatening 
situation, it is not clear from t is study whether learning from f ilure goals more 
effectively buffer self-esteem in high effort than in low effort situations. We addressed 
this question in Study 3 by manipulating participants’ opportunity to practice before an 
academic test. Study 3 also manipulated participants’ beliefs about intelligence to 
examine whether the goal to learn from failure reduced the effect of contingencies of 
self-worth especially among those most vulnerable to failure: the incremental theorists 
who invested high effort but failed to improve.  
Figure 2: Estimated Post-test State Self-Esteem by Academic Contingencies of Self-
Worth (CSW) for Par icipants Low and High on Knowl dge G als (Study 2).
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Study 3
Study 3 extended Study 2 by adding two manipulations. First, we manipulated the 
investment of effort by having participants either practice or not practice before the academic 
test and examined whether the goal to learn from failure more effectively reduced the 
vulnerability associated with academic contingencies when people invest effort prior to failure 
than when they do not invest effort. 
Second, we manipulated people’s entity or incremental theories of intelligence prior to 
practice and examined whether these theories moderated the buffering effect of learning from 
failure goals on self-esteem among academically contingent students.  We anticipated that 
incremental theories (i.e., the belief that one can improve with effort; Dweck, 2000) combined 
with high investment of effort amplify the threat to self-esteem among academically contingent 
students. Incremental theorists believe they can improve with effort. When highly contingent 
incremental theorists invest effort and still fail, they cannot attribute failure to lack of effort; 
failure then indicates lack of ability, threatening self-esteem. In support of this idea, previous 
research found that incremental theories of intelligence led highly contingent students to self-
handicap by withdrawing effort prior to a difficult task (Niiya, Brook, & Crocker, 2010). We 
therefore expected that highly contingent incremental theorists would be particularly prone 
to loss of self-esteem when they practiced and failed. Study 3 tested whether learning from 
failure goals would effectively reduce the effect of academic contingencies among the most 
vulnerable group ― the incremental theorists who practiced and failed. 
Study 3 also tested whether academically contingent entity theorists are protected by 
learning from failure goals after practice. For the entity theorists, we did not expect learning 
from failure goals to have the same buffering effect as for the incremental theorists because 
priming entity theories (i.e., the belief that improvement is not possible) should override 
the goal to learn from failure. For the entity theorists, we, therefore only expected academic 
contingencies to influence their post-test self-esteem regardless of whether or not they 
practiced.
Finally, we replaced the GRE analytical ability test with the Remote Associate Test (RAT; 
McFarlin & Blascovich, 1984) to establish generalizability across multiple tasks. 
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Method
Participants
The 169 college students in sample 3 of Study 1 (45 men, 122 women, and 2 unknown) 
participated in Study 3. Participants were recruited from the psychology subject pool for a 
study on “the effect of practice on intellectual performance”. The majority (71.0%) identified 
themselves as “White or European American,” 13% as “Asian or Asian American,” and the 
remaining ethnicities each constituted less than 5% of the sample. The mean age was 18.7. 
Participants received partial credit toward their course requirement. 
Research Design
The experiment was a 2 (Academic CSW: High vs. Low) X 2 (Learning from failure 
goals: High vs. Low) X 2 (Self-theories: Incremental vs. Entity) X 2 (Practice vs. No practice) 
between-subject design.  
Procedure
Pre-test measures.  Participants sat individually at computers and first completed the 
pretest measures described in Study 1, including the Academic Contingencies of Self-Worth 
subscale (Crocker, Luhtanen, Cooper, & Bouvrette, 2003; α = .83), the Knowledge-Goals 
(α = .71) and Learning from Failure Goals scale (α = .68), the Rosenberg Self-Esteem scale 
(Rosenberg, 1965; α = .83), and the Theories of Intelligence scale (Dweck, 2000; α = .95). 
Manipulation of self-theories.  Next, participants took a “verbal ability test from the 
Academic Intelligence Examination Test” described as “a reliable measure of cognitive ability 
and creativity.” The verbal test had two parts: a reading comprehension test and a difficult 
version of the Remote Associate Tests (RAT; McFarlin & Blascovich, 1984). Following the 
procedures of Bergen (1992), we embedded the manipulation of self-theories in the reading 
comprehension section of the Academic Intelligence Examination Test (see also Niiya et 
al., 2004). The computer randomly displayed either the entity theory priming text or the 
incremental theory priming text. The entity theory priming text described intelligence as a 
fixed factor determined by heredity, whereas the incremental theory priming text argued that 
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intelligence depended heavily on environmental factors. 
Three questions in the format of the GRE test served as a manipulation check. One 
question asked what the text inferred, and participants chose one of the following 5 responses: 
“Intelligence is mainly determined by a person’s genetic inheritance,” “Intelligence is mainly 
determined by the environment,” “Intelligence is equally determined by both genes and 
environment,” “Intelligence is determined by the environment at early childhood only,” and 
“None of the above.” The second question asked what statement the author would agree with: 
(I) “If a child fails on a test, the child should be encouraged to study harder,” (II) “There is 
nothing we can do about intelligence once we are grown up,” and (III) “Knowles’ findings are 
true only in Western society.” Participants chose their answer among the following 5 options: “I 
only,” “II only,” “III only,” “I and III only,” and “ I, II, and III.” Finally, in the third question, 
participants indicated which question the passage tried to answer, again with 5 options: “How 
should we raise gifted children?,” “Why are some people smarter than others?” “Can twins 
have different IQ’s when they are grown up?,” “Is it heredity or is it environment?” and “Is 
intelligence important to succeed in life?”
Manipulation of practice.  Half of the participants took the RAT immediately after the 
manipulation of self-theories, while the other half worked on 8 practice RAT items before the 
actual word association test because “practice has been shown to increase one’s performance a 
lot.” In the practice session, participants received a set of 3 words from the difficult RAT (e.g., 
“business”, “care”, “thought”) and, for each word, they wrote down 3 words or phrases that 
could be associated with each of the stimulus words (e.g., business trip, business school, out 
of business; health care, care follows wealth, care center; thought balloon, thought process, 
afterthought). Participants could not move to the next page until they provided 3 associations 
for each of the 3 words. When participants completed all 9 associations, the computer 
displayed the list of several possible associations until participants clicked on a button to 
proceed to the next practice item. Participants in the practice group had to either spend all 
10 minutes in practice or complete all 8 practice questions before taking the difficult version 
of the RAT. To ensure that all participants did poorly on the test and experienced failure, the 
actual RAT questions differed from the practice RAT items and participants had only 3 minutes 
to complete all 10 questions.
Post-test measures.  Following the RAT, all participants completed the “right now” 
version of the Rosenberg Self-Esteem scale (1965; α = .93). Participants also completed one 
manipulation check item about the difficulty of the test (“How difficult was the RAT portion of 
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the Academic Intelligence Examination Test?”) and one question about the diagnosticity of the 
test (“How accurate do you think the Academic Intelligence Examination Test is as a measure 
of your intelligence?”) on a 7-point scale. Finally, participants were probed for suspicion and 
fully debriefed.  
Results
Manipulation Checks
Self-theories priming.  The manipulation of self-theories was successful. Among the 82 
participants assigned to the entity priming condition, 74 (90.2%) indicated that the text implied 
that “intelligence is mainly determined by a person’s genetic inheritance.” Similarly, among 
the 87 participants assigned to the incremental priming condition, 67 (77.0%) indicated that 
the text implied that “intelligence is mainly determined by the environment.” A chi-square test 
showed a significant association between the priming and the answer choice, χ2 (4) = 143.9, p 
< .001. 
Another manipulation check question asked with which statement the author would 
mostly agree. Again, consistent with our intention, 79.3% of participants in the entity priming 
condition chose the statement, “There is nothing we can do about intelligence once we are 
grown up,” whereas 85.1% of those in the incremental priming condition chose the statement, 
“If a child fails on a test, the child should be encouraged to study harder.” Again, the chi-
square test indicated a significant association, χ2 (4) = 99.4, p < .001. Together, the two 
manipulation check items show that the priming of entity and incremental theories worked as 
intended.
Our last manipulation check indicated that participants in both priming conditions paid 
attention to the text and understood its content. When asked to indicate which question the 
passage answered, the majority of participants in the entity (79.3%) and in the incremental 
priming conditions (77.9%) chose the question, “Is it heredity or is it environment?” while 
14.6% in the entity and 17.2% in the incremental priming conditions chose, “Why are some 
people smarter than others?” Less than 5 participants chose the other options (“How should 
we raise gifted children?”, “Can twins have different IQ’s when they are grown up?”, “Is 
intelligence important to succeed in life?”).   
RAT Difficulty. The RAT test successfully implemented failure for both practice and no-
practice groups. The RAT score ranged from 0 to 4 (out of 10 questions), with a mean of 
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0.8. Those in the practice condition (M = 0.88) did not perform any better than those in the 
no-practice condition (M = 0.71, t (167) = 1.23, n.s.) nor did these two groups differ in the 
perceived difficulty of the RAT (5.97 vs. 5.66, t (164) = 1.72, n.s.). 
Post-Test State Self-Esteem
Prior to the analysis, we created a “pure” measure of learning from failure goals by 
regressing learning from failure goals on knowledge goals and saving the standardized 
residuals. We then used median split to create high and low learning from failure goals groups 
and academic contingent groups. To test whether high learning from failure goals reduced 
self-esteem vulnerability associated with practice and failure among the highly contingent 
incremental theorists, we conducted an ANOVA with academic contingencies of self-worth, 
learning from failure goals, self-theories, and practice as independent variables.8 All the 
analyses controlled for initial self-esteem, initial self-theories, and perceived diagnosticity and 
difficulty of the test. 
As expected, we found a significant Academic CSW X Learning from failure goals 
X Self-theories X Practice interaction (F (1, 149) = 2.99, p = .04; see Figure 3). Separate 
analyses for entity and incremental groups indicated a significant Academic CSW X Learning 
from failure goals X Practice interaction for the incremental group (F (1, 72) = 7.65, p = .01) 
but no three-way interaction for the entity group (F (1, 69) = .02, p = .89, n.s.). To further 
understand the interaction among the incremental theorists, we examined how practice 
interacted with academic contingencies of self-worth separately for those low vs. high on 
learning from failure goals. Consistent with our hypothesis, we found a significant Academic 
CSW X Practice interaction among the incremental theorists low on learning from failure goals 
(F (1, 34) = 6.60, p = .02) but no interaction among the incremental theorists high on learning 
from failure goals (F (1, 34) = 1.87, p = .18, n.s.). These findings indicate that the effect of 
academic contingencies of self-worth on post-failure self-esteem depends on whether one has 
invested prior effort, but only among the incremental theorists who do not have learning from 
8 We also conducted a regression analysis with self-theories and practice entered as dummy codes and 
learning from failure goals and academic contingencies entered as continuous variables. The four-
way interaction was marginally significant: β = .62, p = .09. Regression analyses assume multiplicative 
relationships between variables, an assumption that is difficult to meet when the main prediction is that one 
group (e.g., incremental theorists who practice) will differ from the others (Blalock, 1979). We therefore 
chose to run ANOVAs for the main analyses.
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failure goals. Examination of the interaction showed that among the incremental theorists low 
on learning from failure goals, practice predicted reduced self-esteem of the highly contingent 
participants. In contrast, for the incremental theorists high on learning from failure goals, 
practice did not affect the self-esteem of highly contingent students. In other words, our results 
support our hypothesis that learning from failure goals attenuate the vulnerability of self-
esteem for highly contingent incremental theorists who fail despite practice. 
The lack of Academic CSW X Learning from failure goals X Practice interaction for the 
entity theorists is consistent with our prediction: because entity theorists believe that practice 
does not improve intelligence, failure should threaten their self-esteem regardless of practice. 
Although unexpected, entity theorists also showed a significant Academic CSW X Learning 
from failure goals interaction (F (1, 69) = 8.32, p < .01) with a significant effect of academic 
contingencies of self-worth among those high on learning from failure goals (F (1, 35) = 6.66, 
p = .01) but not among those low on learning from failure goals (F (1, 34) = 1.97, p = .17, 
n.s.). For the entity theorists, endorsing the goal to learn from failure did not reduce the effect 
of academic contingencies, as was the case with the incremental theorists, suggesting that the 
goal to learn from failure is particularly helpful for highly contingent incremental theories who 
invest practice and fail.
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Figure 3.  Post-test State Self-Esteem and Standard Errors of Means by Academic 
Contingencies of Self-Worth (CSW), Learning from Failure Goals, Self-Theories, 
and Practice (Study 3). 
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Discussion
Study 3 showed that the goal to learn from failure reduces the effect of academic 
contingencies of self-worth, especially among the incremental theorists who invest effort prior 
to failure. Failure despite effort threatens the self-esteem of students with contingent self-
worth who believe in the malleability of intelligence because poor performance following 
effort indicates incompetence and lack of self-worth. We found, however, that the goal to learn 
from failure buffers the threat to self-esteem among this otherwise most vulnerable group. 
The highly contingent incremental theorists who did not have the goal to learn from failure 
may have seen effort and practice as a way to improve their performance, demonstrate their 
competence, and, hence, self-worth. Because their desire to learn originated from the desire 
to prove competence, failure following practice might have indicated incompetence and 
threatened their self-esteem. In contrast, highly contingent incremental theorists who had the 
goal to learn from failure might have seen failure as a learning opportunity and thus could 
have maintained self-esteem despite practice. 
Study 3 makes three important contributions. First, whereas Study 2 assumed that the 
goal to learn from failure reduces the effect of contingencies of self-worth especially when 
people invest effort prior to failure, Study 3 directly compared how learning from failure goals 
interact with contingencies of self-worth under effort and no effort conditions and confirmed 
that learning from failure goals benefit people, particularly when they fail despite investing 
effort. College students grapple with increasingly complex academic tasks such as writing 
papers or solving mathematical problems in which progress does not immediately follow 
effort. Often, students get discouraged when they do not see improvement from one exam to 
the next and, due to the accumulating threat of failure, they take defensive actions such as self-
handicapping, procrastinating, or disengaging from the subject. The goal to learn from failure 
might contribute to sustained learning and persistence on challenging tasks and projects. 
Second, although researchers have associated incremental theories with positive academic 
outcomes (Dweck & Molden, 2006), our study shows that incremental theories predict 
increased self-esteem vulnerability when people have contingent self-esteem and when failure 
occurs despite effort. Incremental theories encourage people to invest effort, which is crucial 
for learning new skills or mastering difficult tasks. However, if people do not endorse the goal 
to learn from failure, effort and learning can fuel the desire to prove competence and self-
worth, threatening their self-worth when failure occurs despite effort. Our study suggests that 
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promoting incremental beliefs does not reduce the vulnerability of self-esteem among students 
who have contingent self-worth, especially when failure involves investment of prior effort. 
Finally, Study 3 found that the goal to learn from failure reduces vulnerability associated 
with academically contingent self-worth following practice and failure among the incremental 
theorists but not among the entity theorists. This lack of interaction among the entity theorists 
implies that when people believe that improvement is not possible, the goal of learning from 
failure does not protect their self-esteem. 
General Discussion
Building on Argyris’s (1992) distinction between single- and double-loop learning, we 
created a scale that successfully measures the goals to acquire knowledge and the goals to learn 
from failure. To validate the scale, we presented evidence of the convergent and discriminant 
validity of the measures, and showed that each goal differently predicts people’s vulnerability 
of self-esteem to failure, especially in an ego-threatening situation. Knowledge goals, which 
involve the desire to acquire new information, related to the goals of proving competence 
and self-worth and were not effective in buffering the threat of failure. In contrast, learning 
from failure goals, which involve using the results of one’s efforts, and particularly failure or 
criticism, as a learning opportunity predicted reduced egoistic concerns and more effectively 
buffered failure than knowledge goals. 
Study 1 presented a measure of knowledge goals and learning from failure goals in 
academic contexts. The scale had good psychometric properties and successfully distinguished 
the goal to acquire knowledge and the goal to learn from failure. The correlated two-factor 
structure was consistent across time and across gender, and fit our data better than a one-
factor model, indicating that the scale distinguishes the two types of learning goals. Moreover, 
ego-involved measures such as performance-approach goals, performance-avoidance goals, 
ability-validation goals, and academic contingencies of self-worth positively correlated with 
knowledge goals but negatively correlated with learning from failure goals. These findings 
support our contention that knowledge goals reflect a more ego-involved orientation to 
learning than do learning from failure goals. Study 2 showed that the goal to learn from failure 
reduces the vulnerability of self-esteem associated with academic contingencies of self-
worth following practice and subsequent failure, whereas knowledge goals, mastery goals, or 
incremental theories do not. Finally Study 3 showed that the goal to learn from failure reduced 
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the vulnerability of self-esteem associated with academically contingent self-worth, especially 
among incremental theorists who invested effort prior to failure, the group otherwise most 
vulnerable to failure. Studies 2 and 3 together confirmed the validity of the learning from 
failure goals measure as reflecting less ego-involved learning goals.
Our new knowledge goals and learning from failure goals scale has the benefit of 
differentiating ego-involved from less ego-involved learning goals, a distinction left ambiguous 
in past measures of mastery goals (Elliot & Church, 1997). In previous research, mastery goals 
either did not correlate (e.g., Senko & Harackiewicz, 2005; Elliot, McGregor, & Gable, 1999, 
Study 2; Middleton & Midgley, 1997) or positively correlated with performance goals (e.g., 
Barron & Harackiewicz, 2001; Elliot, et al., 1999, Study 1; Church, Elliot, & Gable, 2001; 
Elliot & Church, 1997; Grant & Dweck, 2003). Consistent with these past findings, Study 1 
showed that mastery goals did not correlate with performance and ability-validation goals, 
and positively correlated with academic contingencies of self-worth. In contrast, our learning 
from failure goals negatively correlated with these ego-involved goals. Moreover, mastery 
goals correlated more strongly with “pure” knowledge goals (with learning from failure goals 
partialled out) than with “pure” learning from failure goals, suggesting that mastery goals do 
not primarily reflect the desire to use failure as a learning opportunity. 
Our research also found that not all learning goals equally predict successful coping with 
failure. Decades of research on learning and mastery goals have found that mastery goals lead 
to positive academic outcomes such as persistence, intrinsic motivation, challenge-seeking, 
and deeper processing of information, whereas performance goals lead to negative outcomes 
such as disengagement, self-handicapping, and surface processing (e.g., Ames, 1992; Elliot, 
McGregor, & Gable, 1999; Rawsthorne & Elliot, 1999). However, our findings suggest that 
mastery goals do not provide immunity from ego-involvement in the learning process and 
could, under ego-threatening circumstances, derail people from learning and increase their 
self-esteem vulnerability. Our previous research supports the idea that ego-involvement in the 
learning process can foster vulnerability of self-esteem among mastery-oriented people. For 
example, mastery-oriented students who staked their self-worth on academic competence (and, 
hence, were highly ego-involved in their learning) avoided investing effort in face of difficulty 
and had vulnerable self-esteem when they failed on a task that required high effort (Niiya, 
Brook, & Crocker, 2010). Consistent with our past findings, Study 2 found that knowledge 
goals do not reduce self-esteem vulnerability of those who have highly contingent self-worth. 
People who have mastery goals or knowledge goals can have the desire to maintain or achieve 
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high self-esteem but, because of their concerns about self-worth, they may become vulnerable 
to failure and miss learning opportunities. Just as pursuing self-esteem paradoxically 
undermines self-esteem (Crocker & Park, 2004), learning goals, combined with the pursuit of 
self-esteem, may paradoxically ruin learning opportunities. 
Finally, our research suggests that failure need not be threatening to the self if people 
view failure as a learning opportunity. When people have the goal to learn from failure, 
success and failure represent tools for growth rather than endpoints. If people have the goal to 
prove self-worth by demonstrating how much or how fast they can learn, they may see failure 
and criticisms as obstacles to avoid or overcome (Carver & Scheier, 2005). However, if people 
have the goal to learn from failure, they may see failure and criticisms as a useful source of 
information that supports their goal. 
Future Directions
Future research should examine whether the goal to learn from failure promotes adaptive 
academic behaviors such as persistence, deeper processing of information, and higher 
performance in ego-threatening situations. Because people with the goal to learn from failure 
appraise failure and setbacks differently, we expect their academic behaviors to also differ. For 
example, people who are high on knowledge goals but low on learning from failure goals may 
want to learn quickly and spend more time on areas they can quickly improve than on difficult 
areas that may take more time to improve. On the other hand, people high on learning from 
failure goals may feel less constrained by time pressure and may persist through challenging 
tasks even when they do not see immediate signs of improvement. Differences in the allocation 
of time and effort may result in higher performance, both short-term and long-term, among 
those who endorse the goal to learn from failure. 
Future studies should also explore contextual factors that encourage people to endorse the 
goal to learn from failure. Moderate test-retest correlations for these goals suggest that they do 
not reflect fixed individual differences. Priming knowledge goals or learning from failure goals 
will allow researchers to examine causality and practitioners to design educational programs to 
reduce people’s vulnerability to failure. 
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Knowledge Goals and Learning from Failure Goals beyond Academia
Although we have created a measure of knowledge goals and learning from failure goals 
in the academic context, we believe that the idea of knowledge goals and learning from failure 
goals broadly applies to every area of life. Learning from failure is important in all activities 
but rarely do people view failure as an opportunity and criticism as a gift. Learning from 
failure goals may minimize threats and encourage learning in all areas, including romantic 
relationships, raising children, self-improvement efforts such as weight loss or quitting 
smoking, political campaigns, receiving feedback at work, reporting errors to one’s supervisor, 
and experimenting with new technologies in an organization. 
We also believe that the goals to acquire knowledge and the goals to learn from failure 
can be conceptualized not only at the individual level, but also at the organizational level. 
Classrooms, hospitals, cockpits, and work settings could have a structure that encourages the 
goal to learn from failure among their members. Research on organizational behavior has 
long examined group and institutional factors that encourage team learning and noted the 
importance of learning from setbacks (e.g., Edmondson, 1999; Lee, Edmondson, Thomke, & 
Worline, 2004; vanDyck, Frese, Baer, & Sonnentag, 2005). Social psychologists may have a 
lot to learn from these adjacent disciplines. 
Conclusion
In this research, we distinguished the goals of acquiring knowledge and the goal of 
learning from failure and showed that they are differently connected to ego-involvement in 
learning. We introduced a scale that successfully captured the two learning goals and reported 
two studies in which learning from failure goals interacted with academic contingencies 
of self-worth to reduce self-esteem vulnerability following failure, especially when people 
invested effort and fail. The findings support the idea that the goal to learn from failure 
enables people to shift from viewing failure as a self-esteem threat to viewing it as a learning 
opportunity. 
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